It is often conjectured that non-state dispute resolution blossoms when state courts are not independent or are perceived as low-quality courts. This conjecture implies a substitutive relationship between state and nonstate dispute resolution. This is the first study that puts these hypotheses to an empirical test. It turns out that the lower the perceived quality of state courts, the less frequently conflicting firms resort to them. Second, firms in common-law countries turn away from state courts significantly more often than firms in civil-law countries. This result sheds doubt on the robustness of results generated within the legal traditions literature. Finally, in states that have created the preconditions for arbitration, businesspeople resort significantly less often to state courts. We interpret this as evidence in favor of the substitution hypothesis.
Introduction
Most economists, even those who are very critical of the state, have traditionally agreed that one of the classical functions of the state is to provide an impartial judiciary that has the function not only to punish criminal behavior, but also to offer impartial third-party dispute resolution to parties who quarrel about the interpretation of contracts voluntarily entered into. This conventional wisdom can be traced back at least to Adam Smith (1776) . In a seminal paper, Landes and Posner (1979) challenged that wisdom: they separate the private-good aspect of adjudication (the decision of the particular case at hand) from the public-good aspect of adjudication (the development of law via its interpretation) and conclude that private provision of adjudication is possible as long as the private-good aspect prevailed.
Over the last couple of decades, the notion of alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") has received quite a boost. Based on the publicity that ADR receives, one gets the impression that ever more conflicts are adjudicated by non-state courts. 1 A couple of questions immediately suggest themselves: Is this a real trend that can be substantiated by hard numbers? If so, what are the reasons for the rise of ADR? In countries in which ADR is strong, is it strong across the board or confined to specific sectors, the size of the conflicting firms, the likelihood of continued interaction, etc.? And: Is ADR particularly strong where the state judiciary is particularly weak, e.g. because it takes too much time, the judiciary is perceived as corrupt or as dependent on other branches of government, etc.?
Answers to these questions might be highly policy-relevant: From previous research Voigt 2003, 2006) , it is known that the quality of the judiciary and in particular its factual independence are crucial for the growth prospects of a country. If it is impossible to substantially improve the quality of the state judiciary within a short period of time, then the creation of the preconditions for successful ADR might be a viable policy alternative.
We conjecture that ADR is in high demand when SDR is bad and test this conjecture in a cross-country setting. Until now, most empirical studies dealing 1 Reliable numbers are, however, awfully hard to get. Serious estimates of the percentage of international contracts containing a mandatory arbitration clause range between 20 and 95% (see Voigt 2008a for precise references).
with ADR have been case studies dealing with single countries. 2 This paper adds to the literature by dealing with the interdependencies between SDR and ADR on a cross-country level for the first time. It turns out that the lower the perceived quality of SDR, the less frequently conflicting firms resort to SDR. Turning away from SDR occurs particularly often when the courts are not perceived as fair und impartial, as honest or uncorrupt, and as consistent in their decisions. Second, in states that have created the preconditions for non-state dispute resolution, businesspeople resort significantly less often to state courts. We interpret this result as evidence in favor of the substitution hypothesis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next Section presents a number of theoretical arguments on possible relationships between SDR and ADR. Our approach to empirically assess the relative importance of ADR is described in Section 3. The estimation approach and the results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes and discusses possible questions for future research.
Some Theory

Defining Various Forms of Dispute Resolution
We propose to separate state dispute resolution from non-state dispute resolution.
SDR takes place if a dispute is resolved by a state servant in this capacity 3 relying on the power of the state to enforce its decisions even against the will of those concerned and by threatening the use of force. There are many forms of dispute resolution not carried out by the state: arbitration, mediation, conciliation, and so forth. In order to emphasize the dichotomy between disputes resolved by the state and disputes resolved by other mechanisms, all other mechanisms will be referred to as non-SDR here.
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To name just a few: Hendley et al. (2000) and Frye and Zhuravskaya (2000) deal with non-state dispute resolution in Russia. McMillan and Woodruff (2000) analyze the relationship between the quality of public-and private-order dispute resolution in Vietnam, Russia, the Ukraine, Romania, Slovakia, and Poland. Galanter and Krishnan (2004) is a careful study of Indian "people's courts" (Lok Adalats). Barfield (2006) describes the relationship between state courts and ADR in contemporary northern Afghanistan. Henrysson and Joireman (2007) emphasize the cost of informal property rights adjudication in Kenya. Schönfelder (2007) emphasizes the unexpectedly low use of non-state dispute resolution in Bulgaria and Croatia. 3 State judges who serve as arbitrators over the weekend are, hence, not counted as producing SDR.
In non-SDR, binding decisions can also be produced by experts who are not lawyers. Conflicting parties sometimes prefer "issue experts" when they believe that the traditions in their trade are important, but complex and hard for nonexperts to comprehend.
A Matter of Choice
Imagine a person interested in exchanging some fairly complex goods with another person in his home country. 4 If they are located in a country with a highly developed institutional system, one would suppose they negotiate a contract that they fix in writing, probably relying on the help of lawyers. Both parties might assume that in case of a conflict, after some bilateral negotiation period, the natural thing is to turn to a state court for conflict resolution. 5 Yet, state courts might be corrupt, subject to direct government influence, very slow, or very costly. Unreliable state courts are equivalent to high transaction costs. Our actors will thus seek alternatives with lower transaction costs. Representatives of the New Institutional Economics have identified quite a few mechanisms that are used to economize on transactions costs: (1) the actors could (unilaterally) invest in their reputation -and make the loss of it very costly; (2) they could (bilaterally) exchange hostages to make the contract self-enforcing; (3) they could decide to set up a common firm (i.e., internalize the transaction); (4) they could decide to search for a more reliable (trilateral) conflict resolution, or (5) they could realize that transaction costs outweigh expected rents of the deal and forego an exchange altogether.
Here, we are interested in their choice between SDR and non-SDR (i.e., the choice between the default mechanism and option 4). But it is important to keep in mind that there are more choices. Option (5) is likely to be most detrimental to the development of an economy, the attractiveness of option (3) depends on corporate law and finance, etc. To simplify the argument, here we will deal only with the choice between SDR and Non-SDR. The simple conjecture to be developed is that 4 We hence refrain from analyzing international arbitration, which would imply additional complexity. 5 Williamson (1985, 20, 32) : "Most studies of exchange assume that efficacious rules of law regarding contract disputes are in place and are applied by the courts in an informed, sophisticated, and lowcost way … the facts, however, disclose otherwise. Most disputes, including many that under current rules could be brought to a court, are resolved by avoidance, self-help and the like … (And) because the efficacy of court ordering is problematic, contract execution falls heavily on (governance structures)." if the expected utility connected with non-SDR is higher than the expected utility of SDR, then actors will favor non-SDR over SDR. Their choice will thus hinge upon quality and costs of both SDR and non-SDR. 6 The next subsection lists a number of factors conjectured to determine the (perceived) quality of SDR. For the moment, we assume that both the expected utility of non-SDR and the number of transactions are exogenously fixed. This implies that the lower the quality of SDR, the higher the expected demand for non-SDR. The first hypothesis to be developed hence assumes that SDR and non-SDR are substitutes for each other. 7 Later subsections deal with the preconditions and incentives for supplying non-SDR.
State Dispute Resolution and Non-SDR as Substitutes
Suppose that the quality and costs of non-SDR are exogenously given. Then the choice between SDR and non-SDR is determined by the quality and costs of SDR. It seems reasonable to assume that the following aspects determine the choice between SDR and non-SDR:
(1) The number of procedural steps that need to be complied with in order to produce a binding decision ("procedural formalism"). 8 If these requirements are perceived as redundant and not contributing to the quality of judicial decision-making, but are time-consuming and costly nevertheless, non-SDR might appear relatively more attractive. But if procedural formalism is perceived as important in producing fair and reliable decisions, non-SDR might not be an attractive alternative.
(2) The perceived expertise of SDR judges; if state judges are perceived as highly qualified and having understanding for the necessities of actors who
6
For simplicity, we assume that the parties to a bilateral contract either both prefer SDR or both prefer non-SDR. It could, of course, very well be that one prefers SDR and the other non-SDR. To keep things simple, we will not deal with this possibility.
7
In microeconomics, substitutes are conventionally described via their price quantity relations (positive cross price elasticity). Here we assume that lower quality implies higher prices. If the quality of SDR falls, its implicit price rises, and we would expect more people to choose non-SDR. Complements can be described in a similar fashion: If the quality of SDR falls, its implicit price rises. This would lead to reduced demand in non-SDR.
8 Djankov et al. (2003) interpret a high degree of procedural formalism as indicating the attempt of government to remain in charge of the outcomes produced by the judiciary. Hayo and Voigt (2008) argue that a high degree of procedural formalism can also be interpreted as an attempt to make the judges play by the rules, which would, in turn, increase legal certainty.
compete in the market, this will contribute to the quality of SDR. SDR judges are experts in legal procedures but not necessarily in the specific issues being disputed. The more specialized the judges of a country, the higher their expertise can be expected to be. An indirect but straightforward way to take this into account is to use the number of highest courts a country has as a proxy for the degree of specialization among the judges of the country. 9 (3) The perceived level of corruption within the judiciary. Corruption among judges means that the higher willingness to pay for a decision might dominate other criteria, such as having complied with a contract. Contracts hence become relatively meaningless in such an environment. If partners are interested in the contents of their contract and corruption within the state judiciary is perceived as high, then non-SDR appears relatively more attractive. (4) The perceived degree of judicial independence; lack of corruption in the judiciary refers to independence from the conflicting parties whereas independence refers to the absence of pressure by members of the other government branches. Judicial independence appears particularly relevant in cases in which the government has a stake. If the judiciary's independence from the other branches of government is perceived as low, then non-SDR is relatively more attractive.
(5) The perceived degree of judicial accountability; judges are supposed to implement legislation. If the judicial system of a country is able to create mechanisms that make judges implement the law, then judicial decisionmaking is expected to be predictable. Being able to form expectations that have a high chance of turning out to be correct is important in business. A high degree of accountability is thus presumed to make SDR more attractive. 10 (6) The monetary costs of using SDR; the lower the monetary costs of SDR, the more attractive is SDR, ceteris paribus.
9
An alternative tack on this issue could be to have a look at the career pattern of SDR judges: if they are made judges very early in life, the chances that they have gathered some of their own experience with having to compete on the market (e.g. as lawyers) appear to be lower than if they are appointed later in life. Yet another alternative could be to take explicit account of the number of "issue experts" represented at special chambers of state courts. In Germany, e.g., so-called
Wirtschaftskammern ("economic chambers") are primarily staffed with issue experts.
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Yet, a case getting to court is sufficient evidence for incompatible expectations of the conflicting parties.
(7) The time costs of using SDR; time is frequently of the essence in business, so arriving at final decisions fast can be a big asset in favor of SDR. 11
Some of these factors reinforce each other: if judicial corruption is low, then one would, e.g., expect accountability or predictability to be rather high. Other factors need to be traded off against each other: a high degree of procedural formalism or accountability is likely to be costly in terms of both money and time. A number of implications follow from these observations: the expected utility from the use of SDR also depends on the kind of exchange the interacting partners want to carry out. If it is highly complex and expensive, the expertise of the judges might be key. If, on the other hand, it is the exchange of a commodity, speed and monetary costs might be weighted more heavily. This means that it appears desirable to control for (i) the sector of the parties, (ii) the size of the contract in monetary terms, but possibly also for (iii) the size of the interacting firms. It further means that it is desirable to keep the determinants of SDR quality apart and not to lump them into one overall indicator. 12 We argue that the perceived quality of SDR is determined by these variables.
Formulated as hypothesis #1a: The lower the perceived quality of SDR, the more frequently will non-SDR be used, ceteris paribus.
This formulation assumes a given quality of non-SDR. Yet, the frequency with which non-SDR is used will also depend on its perceived quality. Prima facie, the perceived quality of non-SDR is expected to be determined by exactly the same factors. Formulated as hypothesis #1b: Under an exogenously given quality of SDR, the number of transactions structured under non-SDR will be higher, the higher the perceived quality of non-SDR. Djankov et al. (2003) interpret a high degree of procedural formalism as equivalent to a high degree of interventionism of the sovereign into judicial decision-making. A high degree of formalism should, hence, make SDR less attractive. They further claim that civil-law countries systematically have a higher degree of formalism than common-law countries. In combination, these two
11
As soon as a case is with a court, the party expecting to lose might have incentives to slow down the process. Whether and to what degree this is possible depends inter alia on procedural law.
12
Lumping might, however, be necessary out of more pragmatic econometric reasons: given that the number of observations is limited, an overall indicator helps save degrees of freedom. Moreover, to the degree that variables reinforce each other, using an overall indicator might dispense with the problem of multicollinearity.
statements can be formulated as hypothesis #2: C.p., use of non-SDR will be more frequent in civil-law than in common-law countries.
Now suppose that many potential contractors perceive the degree of procedural formalism implemented in SDR as too high. It is straightforward to assume that in such a situation, entrepreneurs will try to satisfy the demand for less formal conflict resolution. Yet, conflicting parties might still be interested in getting an enforceable award. Decisions by arbitration organizations are frequently enforceable via state courts. This is not the case with regard to other forms of non-SDR, hence our emphasis on this more fine-grained delineation. 13 Before nonstate courts can issue decisions that are enforceable even in state courts, the state needs to create the respective preconditions.
The procedural law needs to allow for the possibility to have non-state courts decide upon conflicts. Most likely, the procedural law will contain a number of minimum requirements that need to be met before enforceable awards can be issued. They can refer to necessary procedures, the qualifications of arbitrators, and so forth. If arbitral awards are not automatically enforceable, the resources needed in order to make them enforceable need to be taken into account (these include costs in terms of time and money but also the probability of finally getting the award The possibility that weak states might not even secure the enforcement of SDR decisions only reinforces the complementarity consideration.
14 There is a long discussion whether ADR can work even in the absence of the explicit backing by the state judicial system. Landes and Posner (1979, 247f.) argue that non-SDR depends on the enforceability of awards with state courts, whereas Benson (1988, 656f.) In the last subsection, the hypothesis that the use of non-SDR should be more frequent in civil-law countries was advanced. In light of the considerations developed here, this hypothesis needs to be reformulated. Assuming that civil-law countries have chosen a high degree of procedural formalism not only in SDR but also in non-SDR, the modified hypothesis #2(mod) is: C.p., there will be no significant difference in the use of non-SDR between civil-law and common-law countries.
Estimation Approach and Data Description
To test whether low quality SDR is correlated with high use of non-SDR, a measure for the use of non-SDR is needed as a dependent variable. On the right hand side, a measure for the quality of SDR (i.e., its implicit price) is necessary.
Other potentially relevant covariates would be part of the Z-Matrix and the equation to be estimated would look like this:
Unfortunately, we will not be able to estimate this equation, because we are not aware of any measure for the quantity of non-SDR across countries. Ascertaining this number is close to impossible: Often, dispute resolution does not take place within formal organizations, but conflicts are settled by village elders or clergy and no statistics are kept at all. But even numbers from formal arbitration An alternative left-hand-side variable is also taken from the Investment Climate Survey of the Bank. After being asked whether they are member of a business association, entrepreneurs were asked for the most important services provided by the business association. One option was "dispute resolution"; possible answers were "no value", "minor value", "moderate value", "major value", and "critical value". We assume that attributing a high value to this service implies that respondents are not entirely satisfied with SDR. Given that neither dependent variable is a perfect proxy for what we want to measure, relying on two different variables can be considered as a robustness check of the results.
We now move to the data we use for the right-hand-side variables and begin with possible proxies for the quality of SDR. In choosing an adequate indicator, two choices need to be made: we need to choose between subjective and objective indicators and we need to choose between overall indicators of quality offered by SDR -or more fine-grained ones that decompose the various aspects that determine the quality of justice. We begin with an overall indicator that was also generated as part of the Investment Climate Surveys of the World Bank. More than 30,000 entrepreneurs were asked what level of confidence they had in their judiciary system. More precisely, the number used here reflects the percentage of firms that agree with the statement "I am confident that the judicial system will enforce my contractual and property rights in business disputes." 16 Let us move on to more fine-grained indicators that reveal information on the quality of specific aspects of SDR. If we are interested in policy implications, more detailed indicators might have the advantage of pointing us toward specific aspects that -if improved -could have substantial effects. The more specific variables reflect the degree to which courts are perceived as (1) "fair & impartial", (2) "honest", (3) "quick", (4) "affordable", (5) "consistent" and (6) being able to enforce their decisions.
Unfortunately, we are not aware of any indicators proxying for the quality of non-SDR. This implies that no coefficient for the "Qual Non-SDR " variable can be estimated. Devising such an indicator is definitely a desideratum.
We move on to the presentation of our control variables. The choice between SDR and non-SDR could also be influenced by (1) state support for non-SDR, (2) the factual supply of formal non-SDR, and (3) the knowledge that dispute resolution other than SDR exists. We propose to control for state support by a synthetic variable composed of three dummy variables, namely (i) ratification of the New York Convention, (ii) having passed UNCITRAL model law domestically, and (iii) membership in ICSID. Each aspect can earn a country one point, such that the composite indicator can take on values between 0 and 3. We call the variable "Arbitration possible". 17
16
We have to assume that respondents do not consider non-SDR part of "the judicial system". The survey that the World Economic Forum carries out annually contains a related variable that has, however, a different emphasis. The variable "Efficiency of the legal framework" asks for consent to the statement "The legal framework in your country for private businesses to settle disputes and challenge the legality of government actions and/or regulations." Whereas the World Bank variable is interested in private law disputes, the focus of this variable is on disputes regarding public law. Assuming that the state as an actor in domestic affairs is not ready to opt out of SDR, low levels of consent to this statement should not lead to higher use of non-SDR.
It cannot be excluded that autocrats prefer to keep as many things as possible under their control, including conflict resolution. We hence also control for a country's democracy ranking, drawing on the Polity IV indicator that ranks countries between -10 (perfect autocracy) and 10 (perfect democracy).
The factual supply of non-SDR is almost as difficult to ascertain as its factual use. Non-SDR will primarily be offered by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). I thus assume that the potential supply of Non-SDR increases in the number of NGOs. For lack of a better proxy, the number of existing NGOs is here used as a control for Non-SDR supply.
Finally, firms -and others -can demand non-SDR only if they are aware of this tool to resolve disputes. Differences in the available information about the supply of non-SDR thus need to be controlled for. We do this by controlling (i) for the age of the current regime -assuming that the longer it has already existed, the higher the number of actors that have learned about non-SDR; (ii) a dummy for Central and Eastern Europe; based on the assumption that the state used to be omnipresent in this region until two decades ago, non-SDR is expected to be used less than in other regions; (iii) the degree of an economy's openness. If firms have many international contacts, they will have faced the option of opting out of their national law. This might induce a learning effect that this could also be possible for domestic transactions.
In addition, we control for per capita income. Given that high-income countries generally enjoy high-quality SDR, we expect this variable to have a positive coefficient. Legal origins are taken into account in order to be able to test hypotheses 2 and 2mod empirically.
Finally, we also control for the degree of an economy's informality. Informal firms are not registered and therefore refrain from drawing on the formal institutions supplied in their country. Informality can have many reasons such as the difficulty of becoming formal, a high degree of regulation, high tax rates, and so forth. But the informality option also has costs, namely not realizing potential economies of scale, not being able to rely on "official" financing, and so on. Informality is interesting for us, because the deficient quality of SDR should NOT be a reason to remain informal, because entrepreneurs can decide to play by the substantive legislation of their country and to opt in favor of non-SDR in case of a conflict. Connecting the degree of informality observed in an economy with the reliance on SDR thus allows us to disentangle the reasons for non-SDR: if both the substance of the rules and their enforcement are perceived as weak, then we would expect firms to remain informal altogether. If only the enforcement is weak -but the substantive rules are adequate -then we should expect to see a low level of informality coupled with a high level of non-SDR. Table 2 contains the descriptive statistics on the relevant variables used here. Their exact definitions as well as their sources can be found in Appendix 2.
The approach described until now is based on country averages and compares these averages across countries. This is warranted if we assume the quality of SDR to be quite homogenous within countries. Nevertheless, potentially relevant information such as whether firms are state-owned or whether they operate in the capital or elsewhere is disregarded. This is why we estimate the first of the two previously discussed models on the basis of individual firms data. Using firm level data has the additional advantage that limited degrees of freedom are not a problem.
The additional control variables are the following: (1) the percentage of the firm owned by the state; (2) a dummy variable coded 1 if the firm has holdings or operations in other countries and 0 otherwise; (3) the number of separate operating facilities within a given country; (4) a variable controlling for the size of the city in which the surveyed firm is located; and (5) a variable ranging from 0 (no obstacle) to 4 (severe obstacle) indicating whether the legal system / conflict resolution are a "problem for the operation and growth" of the surveyed business.
Here are our conjectures regarding these controls: (1) state-owned firms are more likely to resort to SDR. Regarding controls (2) through (4), conjectures are not so straightforward. Operating in other countries could, e.g., come along with firsthand experience regarding Non-SDR in international business transactions which could be correlated with a more heavy reliance on Non-SDR even domestically. On the other hand, an internationally operating firm is more likely to be politically influential and to be well connected. If these connections enable the firm to get a favorable hearing in state courts, it could be more likely to resort to SDR. Similar arguments can be made regarding controls (3) and (4). Regarding control (5), we expect more severe problems with the legal system to be correlated with less reliance on SDR and, hence, a negative coefficient.
Estimation Results and Possible Interpretations
In Table 3 , the percentage of all disputes not resolved in state courts is regressed upon our explanatory variable plus controls. These regressions are run on the basis of firm level data. To prevent the misrepresentation of countries from which there was an above (below) average number of responses, the observations were weighed by the number of firms per country. Further, by controlling for clustering within individual countries, we relax the otherwise required assumption of independence within and across countries.
Column 1 of Table 3 presents a baseline model with four explanatory variables.
Variation in non-state court use is significantly correlated with differences in per capita income. This is the expected result as one can assume that states with higher per capita income are able to spend more on their courts and that use of state courts should increase in per capita income. Ex ante, we can, however, not exclude that past a certain level of per capita income, use of state courts could start to decline. This could, e.g., be the case if the complexity of cases increases in income and litigants do not believe that state judges have the necessary expertise at their disposal. 18 Firms in countries that have passed legislation favorable to non-SDR are significantly less likely to rely on SDR. The effect is not only highly significant but also very substantial: a switch from non-recognition of non-SDR to complete support of it could imply a 25 point increase in the use of non-state courts (ARBITRATION POSSIBLE). Unexpectedly, firms in common-law countries rely significantly more often on non-state courts than firms in civil-law countries. 19 Finally, firms in transition countries seem more likely to use non-state courts than firms in other countries. Ceteris paribus, a firm in a transition country is around 7 percentage points more likely to resort to ADR.
The only change in column 2 is that we have added the confidence in court variable. It is significant on the 5% level and always remains so in all other specifications. Substantially, a one-standard-deviation increase in the confidence variable leads to a decrease of around 51 percentage points in the use of state courts. Note that the size of this effect is almost unaffected by the number and kinds of control variables added (including those in Table 4 ).
Turning to columns (3) to (7), we see (3) that firms in more democratic countries are less likely to resort to SDR, (4) that the number of years a country has been democratic is, although statistically significant, substantially negligible as determinant for the choice between SDR and non-SDR, and (5) that the same is true for the degree of informality observed in a country, (6) but that the number of Re-estimating the first model and adding the square of per capita provides evidence in favor of this conjecture. But the income levels above which the square effect leads to lower use of state courts is so high that this is more a theoretical possibility (not reported in Table) .
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La Porta et al. (2008) have recently interpreted legal origins as reflecting different styles in the social control of economic life. If "the common law" reflects a general desire for little state intervention, then not subjecting one's disputes to SDR might even be compatible with La Porta et al.
non-governmental organizations is positively correlated with SDR. A one-point increase in the number of NGOs would be connected with a 1.18% decrease in the use of non-state courts. This can be interpreted as support of the complementarity hypothesis assuming that a high number of NGOs is conducive to high-quality SDR because some NGOs are likely to monitor the performance of state courts; but a high number of NGOs is also likely to be correlated with the supply of non-SDR. Column 7 includes all variables in one model; as already mentioned, "confidence" remains significant on the 5% level with its coefficient completely unchanged.
In Table 4 , the model from Table 3 , column 7 is augmented with up to five firmspecific variables. Of the five variables, only one turns out to be significant, namely "state" which indicates what percentage of the firm is owned by government. Our conjecture regarding this variable is that the more state-owned a company is, the higher its probability of resorting to state courts for having its disputes settled. This conjecture is supported by the data: a ten percent increase in state ownership would be accompanied by a five point increase in resorting to state courts.
In Table 5 , there are two important changes: First, we now estimate the models on the country level and not the firm level. Second, the dependent variable now is the importance that businesses attach to dispute resolution services offered by business associations. The models contained in Table 5 can thus be interpreted as a kind of robustness check of the previous results. The most relevant result in our context is that the confidence variable remains significant in all specifications. It has a negative sign, indicating that the higher the confidence in (state) courts, the lower the value attributed to (private) dispute resolution services. As before, the dummy variable for transition countries is highly significant but all other variables are not. 20 The findings correspond remarkably well with the previous estimates which increases our confidence in the results. Table 6 works with the same benchmark as the models in Table 3 but instead of "confidence" as a very broad overall indicator for the quality of SDR, single components supposedly determining the quality of SDR are now included. Plugging in single components allows us to make inferences about the details that conflicting firms care about in SDR. It is interesting that of the six components taken into consideration, only three turn out to be significant for the choice
20
Notice that this country sample is not entirely identical to the first one. Both lists of countries can be found in the first appendix.
between SDR and Non-SDR. The components that do not seem to influence this choice are the perception of one's country's court system as (i) quick, (ii) affordable and (iii) getting its decisions enforced. 21 On the other hand, components that do seem to influence the decision are the perception of the court system as (i) fair and impartial, (ii) honest/uncorrupt, and (iii) consistent. The components that are statistically significant do have an important substantial influence on the choice between SDR and non-SDR: Every one-point improvement on a scale from 1 to 6 correlates with an increased likelihood of drawing on SDR of around 8 percentage points.
These results are potentially extremely important for policy recommendations: the preferences of the more than 30,000 business people that are the basis of these results seem to indicate that, even if state courts decide in a timely manner and decisions are affordable and enforceable, this does not make them turn to SDR. If the state, for whatever reason, is interested in having disputes resolved by state courts, it should invest in ensuring consistency of court decisions and the fairness as well as the honesty of state courts. Unfortunately, ensuring timely and affordable decisions seems to be less difficult than ensuring the three decisive traits.
Column 7 was generated by starting with all six components and eliminating the least significant component, one after another. The resulting model reinforces some of the observations based on the single components. Timeliness and enforceability now turn up as significant but have the "wrong" sign. The coefficient for the consistency of court decisions almost doubles in size. On a scale from one to six, every one-step improvement in the consistency of court decisions means almost 20 percentage points more disputes resolved in state courts.
Conclusions and Outlook
Starting from the observation that the quality of dispute resolution supplied by many states is mediocre or outright bad, the conjecture was developed that a low quality of SDR could induce a more frequent use of non-SDR. Three hypotheses
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One way to make this result appear plausible is to assume that a high degree of enforceability is also a precondition for non-SDR to work well (which is definitely the case with regard to arbitration). If state courts are strong in enforceability, the enforceability of arbitration awards is also likely to be strong. If this is true, strong enforceability of state court decisions would, hence, be no reason to turn away from non-SDR.
were developed and then tested. It turned out that the lower the perceived quality of SDR, the less frequently conflicting firms resort to SDR. Turning away from SDR occurs particularly often when the courts are not perceived as fair und impartial, honest or uncorrupt, and consistent in their decisions. Second, it was conjectured that firms in civil-law countries might turn away from SDR more frequently than firms in common-law countries because previous research (Djankov et al. 2003) showed that legal procedures in civil-law countries are more formalistic. Our estimates refute this conjecture. If anything, the exact opposite is the case: firms in common-law countries turn away from SDR more often than firms in other countries. Third, it was hypothesized that the state could lay the foundations for non-SDR and the more thorough those foundations are, the more frequently would firms choose non-SDR as their preferred way of resolving disputes. The results show that this is, indeed, the case.
The fourth hypothesis, that the traits of non-SDR mechanisms factually chosen reveal us information about traits desired by businesspeople, could not be tested here, because we only have information on the traits that make businesspeople choose SDR instead of non-SDR. This implies that coming up with policy recommendations would be very speculative. Before this can be done, more finegrained data are definitely needed. These include data on the frequency with which non-SDR is used. It is desirable to have detailed information on the specific non-SDR mechanism used, possibly even as a function of the sectors the contracting firms come from, the size of the contract, the size of the firm, and so forth. It is further desirable to have more specific information on the perceived quality of non-SDR mechanisms similar to the information on the quality of SDR.
This would make explicit comparisons between SDR and non-SDR possible.
Drawing policy conclusions also presupposes more information on the effects of an intensive use of non-SDR on (1) the number of contracts concluded (direct effect) and on (2) changes in SDR (indirect effect). Sometimes, creating the preconditions for non-SDR has been interpreted as a sort of "quick fix" for a lowquality SDR because such reforms would have a quick effect without implying huge government expenditure. Yet, a report by the Center for Democracy and Governance (1998, 6) observes: "ADR systems tend to achieve efficient settlements at the expense of consistent and uniform practice", which implies a trade-off between the private good and the public good aspect of adjudication that we began this paper with. A functioning "shadow of the law" presupposes consistent decision-making at state courts. This can increase the number of contracts and, hence, the degree of the division of labor realized, without an increase in conflicts taken either to SDR or non-SDR, because actors can form expectations on likely court decisions -and can thus refrain from factually going to court. The exact definitions of the variables as well as their sources are documented in Appendix 1. Observations 11,812 11,812 11,812 11,812 11,812 11,812 11,812 *, **, und *** show that the estimated parameter is significantly different from zero on the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. The numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the estimated (country cluster adjusted) standard errors. Firm-level regressions use as weights the number of observed firms within a country. All models include country and industry dummies (not reported). Observations 11,812 11,812 11,812 11,812 11,812 11,812 *, **, und *** show that the estimated parameter is significantly different from zero on the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. The numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the estimated (country cluster adjusted) standard errors. Firm-level regressions use as weights the number of observed firms within a country. All models INCLUDE POLITY IV, AGEDEM, INFORMAL and INGO as further control variables. All models include country and industry dummies (not reported). *, **, und *** show that the estimated parameter is significantly different from zero on the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. The numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the estimated t-statistics based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. SER is the standard error of the regression, and J.-B. the value of the Jarque-Bera test on normality of the residuals. All regressions include age, checks, and polity iv as standard explanatory variables. "LP" indicates the lay participation variable that is interacted. *, **, und *** show that the estimated parameter is significantly different from zero on the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. The numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the estimated t-statistics based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. SER is the standard error of the regression, and J.-B. the value of the Jarque-Bera test on normality of the residuals. All regressions include age, checks, and polity iv as standard explanatory variables. "LP" indicates the lay participation variable that is interacted.
